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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 
("PHEAA") appeals the District Court's affirmance of the 
Bankruptcy Court's decision to discharge Patricia 
Brightful's student loan obligations. The issue presented by 
this appeal is whether Brightful's student loans burden her 
with an "undue hardship" that would render them 
dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8). Applying 
the three-pronged test we adopted in In re: Faish, 72 F.3d 
298 (3d Cir. 1995), we hold that Brightful's student loans 
do not constitute an "undue hardship," and will reverse the 
District Court. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural Background 
 
This case arises out of an adversary proceeding filed by 
Brightful, seeking a determination that her student loans 
are dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8) because 
repayment of the loans would cause "undue hardship." On 
November 8, 1999, after a hearing on the merits, the 
Bankruptcy Court ruled that the loans were dischargeable. 
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PHEAA appealed, and the District Court affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court's decision on February 28, 2000, based 
solely upon the Bankruptcy Court's Order and 
Memorandum. PHEAA now appeals the District Court's  
order.1 
 
The Bankruptcy Court made the following findings of 
fact. At the time of the Bankruptcy Court proceedings, 
Brightful was a 46-year-old single mother of a 14-year-old 
daughter. Due to their eviction from their former residence 
on July 19, 1999, Brightful and her daughter reside with 
Brightful's sister in a crowded three-bedroom home. The 
Bankruptcy Court characterized Brightful's living situation 
as "sub-marginal by any standards." 
 
The Bankruptcy Court noted that Brightful has no 
degree, but has completed the equivalent of two years of 
college education. Most recently, she attended the New 
School for Social Research in New York City, but she has 
also attended the Community College of Philadelphia, 
Temple University, and Pierce Junior College. During the 
late 1980's and early 1990's, Brightful was employed full- 
time as a legal secretary at the Dechert law firm in 
Philadelphia. Since the early 1990's, she has worked part- 
time at Dechert. At the time of the hearing, Brightful was 
paid $18 per hour for her work at Dechert, but was only 
working nine to 30 hours per month, and estimated that 
she would earn approximately $8,500 in 1999. During 
1998, she earned $20,000 at Dechert. Additionally, the 
Bankruptcy Court remarked that Brightful had filed sexual 
discrimination and sexual harassment charges against 
Dechert in 1998. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court described Brightful as "very 
intelligent" and "physically healthy." However, the court 
also determined that Brightful had "glaring psychiatric 
problems" and that she was "emotionally unstable." The 
court noted that Brightful had made two suicide attempts, 
one in the last year. The court concluded that it was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the original adversary 
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 157(b), and the District Court had 
jurisdiction over the first appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). 
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unlikely that Brightful would ever attain her college degree, 
and that Brightful lacked useful vocational training. Finally, 
the court determined that Brightful's pursuit of sexual 
discrimination charges against Dechert had both scarred 
her future prospects with that firm and accounted for the 
sharp reduction in her income in 1999 as compared to 
1998. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The trier of fact in this case was the Bankruptcy Court, 
not the District Court. Therefore "[w]e are in as good a 
position as the district court to review the findings of the 
bankruptcy court, so we review the bankruptcy court's 
findings by the standards the district court should employ, 
to determine whether the district court erred in its review." 
Fegeley v. United States, 118 F.3d 979, 982 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 
F.2d 98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981)). We must accept the 
Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous, but we exercise plenary review over legal issues. 
Id. We therefore exercise plenary review over the 
Bankruptcy Court's application of our three-pronged Faish 
test to the facts of this case. See Brunner v. New York State 
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(noting that whether debtor suffers "undue hardship" under 
11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8) is a conclusion regarding the legal 




The Bankruptcy Code provision at issue provides that: 
 
       (a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 
       1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an 
       individual debtor from any debt -- . . . 
 
        (8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan 
       made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, 
       or made under any program funded in whole or in part 
       by a governmental unit or nonprofit institution, or for 
       an obligation to repay funds received as an educational 
       benefit, scholarship or stipend, unless excepting such 
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       debt from discharge under this paragraph will impose 
       an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's 
       dependents; 
 
11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8) (emphasis added). 
 
In In re: Faish, 72 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 1995), we analyzed 
this statutory section in detail.2 We noted the difficulty in 
applying the "undue hardship" exception of 11 U.S.C. 
S 523(a)(8), because the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code 
did not define "undue hardship." Id. at 302. As a result, we 
had to look to the legislative purpose behind 11 U.S.C. 
S 523(a)(8) for guidance. Ultimately, we adopted the Second 
Circuit's three-pronged test for determining "undue 
hardship," found in Brunner v. New York State Higher 
Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987), 
because the Brunner test was the "most logical and 
workable of the established tests" for assessing"undue 
hardship." Faish, 72 F.3d at 306. 
 
Under this test, "undue hardship" requires a three-part 
showing: (1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on 
current income and expenses, a minimal standard of living 
for herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans; 
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this 
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of 
the repayment period for student loans; and (3) that the 
debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. Id. at 
304-05. The debtor has the burden of establishing each 
element of this test by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
at 306; see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991) 
(holding that "the standard of proof for the dischargeability 
exceptions in 11 U.S.C. S 523(a) is the ordinary 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard"). If one of the 
elements of the test is not proven, the inquiry must end 
there, and the student loans cannot be discharged. Faish, 
72 F.3d at 306. Moreover, this test must be strictly 
construed: equitable concerns or other extraneous factors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. At the time that Faish was decided, the "undue hardship" exception 
appeared in 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8)(B). In 1998, Congress amended the 
statute by incorporating this exception into 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(8). This 
change is irrelevant to our analysis, however, because the language of 
the two versions is exactly the same. 
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not contemplated by the test may not be imported into the 
analysis of "under hardship." Id. 
 
Applying this test to Brightful's situation, we must first 
determine whether she has met her burden of 
demonstrating that she cannot maintain, based on current 
income and expenses, a minimal standard of living for 
herself and her dependent daughter if forced to repay the 
loans. We note that this inquiry is made difficult by the fact 
that the Bankruptcy Court made no factual findings 
regarding Brightful's expenses. Brightful did submit some 
information and testified briefly regarding her expenses, but 
PHEAA contends that much of this information is 
inaccurate, incomplete and undocumented. 
 
For its part, the Bankruptcy Court appeared merely to 
assume that Brightful could not maintain a "minimal" 
standard of living because her 1999 income, which the 
court estimated at $8,500, was so low. While this might be 
a reasonable assumption, it is also true that Brightful 
earned significantly more money in 1998 ($20,000), is not 
on public assistance, and apparently has no significant 
housing expenses because she is living in her sister's home. 
Furthermore, in its November 8, 1999 order, the 
Bankruptcy Court did not even mention the amount of 
Brightful's loan payments. Our own examination of the 
record, however, reveals that as of October 20, 1999, 
Brightful's student loan indebtedness totaled $52,261.70 in 
principal and interest, which corresponds to a loan 
payment of $626 per month over the ten year life of the loans.3 
 
Despite the dearth of information regarding Brightful's 
expenses, we nonetheless will assume, for the sake of 
argument, that at the time of the Bankruptcy Court 
proceedings, Brightful could not make her student loan 
payments and still maintain a minimal standard of living 
for herself and her daughter. As detailed below, we think it 
clear that Brightful has failed to meet her burden under the 
second prong of the Faish test, and thus we will not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. PHEAA points out, however, that Brightful is eligible to consolidate 
her 
student loans for a period of twenty-five years, which apparently would 
reduce her monthly payments to $355.57. 
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concern ourselves with the deficient state of the record 
regarding the first prong. 
 
Under the second element of the test, Brightful must 
prove that additional circumstances exist indicating that 
she cannot maintain a minimal standard of living for a 
significant portion of the repayment period if forced to 
repay her loans. This is a demanding requirement. As we 
indicated in Faish, it is not enough for Brightful to 
demonstrate that she is currently in financial straits; 
rather, she must prove "a total incapacity . . . in the future 
to pay [her] debts for reasons not within[her] control." Id. 
at 307 (quoting In re: Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985)). In other words, "dischargeability of student loans 
should be based upon the certainty of hopelessness, not 
simply a present inability to fulfill financial commitment." 
Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (quoting In re: Briscoe, 16 B.R. 
128, 131 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)); see also In re: Ballard, 60 
B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986) (explaining that "[a] 
finding of undue hardship is reserved for the exceptional 
case and requires the presence of unique or extraordinary 
circumstances which would render it unlikely that the 
debtor ever would be able to honor his obligations"). 
 
As noted earlier, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that 
Brightful most likely would never attain her college degree, 
lacks useful vocational training, suffers glaring psychiatric 
problems, is emotionally unstable, and that her pursuit of 
sexual discrimination charges against Dechert had both 
scarred her future prospects with that firm and accounted 
for the sharp reduction in her income in 1999 as compared 
to 1998. On the basis of these factual findings, the court 
believed that there was a "substantial likelihood that 
[Brightful's] sub-marginal economic circumstances will 
persist for many years, probably for the rest of her life," and 
that therefore she had satisfied the second prong of the 
Faish test. 
 
At the outset, we think the Bankruptcy Court's finding 
that Brightful lacks useful vocational training is clearly 
erroneous. It is undisputed that Brightful has worked for 
over a decade in both a full-time and part-time capacity as 
a legal secretary at Dechert. As part of this employment, 
she is trained to operate office equipment and computer 
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software. Brightful has never suggested that she lacked the 
skills to perform the duties of a legal secretary-- indeed, 
such a suggestion would contradict the fact that she 
currently holds that position, albeit in a part-time capacity. 
Thus, we reject the Bankruptcy Court's unsupported 
conclusion that Brightful lacks useful vocational training. 
 
Similarly, we reject the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions 
that Brightful's pursuit of sexual discrimination charges 
against Dechert had both scarred her future prospects with 
that firm and accounted for the sharp reduction in her 
income in 1999 as compared to 1998. During the 
Bankruptcy Court proceedings, neither the circumstances 
surrounding Brightful's sexual discrimination charges nor 
the consequences flowing from these charges were 
adequately explored. Rather, as the Bankruptcy Court 
noted in the beginning of its opinion, the circumstances 
surrounding the charges were "unexplained." There is 
simply no basis in the record for the Bankruptcy Court's 
conclusion that Brightful was the victim of retaliation for 
bringing charges against Dechert. Indeed, such a 
conclusion would seem to be contradicted by Brightful's 
continued employment at Dechert a higher rate of pay ($18 
per hour) than she received prior to filing her charges. In 
any event, the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions on this 




4. Furthermore, even were we to accept the Bankruptcy Court's 
conclusions, they would not support a finding of"additional 
circumstances" indicating that Brightful cannot maintain a minimal 
standard of living for a significant portion of her loan repayment period. 
If Brightful's employment prospects at Dechert were foreclosed, it would 
be her responsibility to diligently pursue employment elsewhere -- 
something that the record indicates she has not done, as evidenced by 
her failure to have a current resume and her inability to recall the 
names of temporary employment agencies that she allegedly contacted in 
the past. See, e.g., In re: Greco, 251 B.R. 670, 677 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2000) (holding that the debtor had failed to meet her burden under the 
second prong of Faish because "[t]he testimony offered by the Debtor at 
trial does not reveal a diligent effort on her part to secure a stable, 
salaried job," and "the Debtor has not demonstrated any efforts to seek 
employment in another field"). 
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The Bankruptcy Court gave great weight to Brightful's 
alleged emotional and psychiatric infirmities, concluding 
from Brightful's testimony that she was emotionally 
unstable and that she had "glaring" psychiatric problems. 
We think these findings have some support in the record, 
especially considering that Brightful has apparently 
attempted suicide twice in her life. PHEAA argues, however, 
that such findings require expert testimony, and cannot be 
made simply on the basis of the debtor's testimony. We 
disagree. It was appropriate for the Bankruptcy Court, as 
the trier of fact, to assess Brightful's testimony and draw 
reasonable conclusions regarding her mental and emotional 
state. E.g., In re: Cline, 248 B.R. 347, 350 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2000) (explaining that "[t]here is no reason to view the trial 
court's findings [regarding the debtor's emotional state] as 
unreliable merely because no expert evidence was 
introduced"). 
 
What is missing from the Bankruptcy Court's analysis, 
however, is any discussion of the nature of Brightful's 
emotional and psychiatric problems, or how these problems 
prevent her from being gainfully employed. The Bankruptcy 
Court seems to have merely assumed that Brightful's 
emotional and psychiatric problems would automatically 
preclude her from holding full-time employment. Yet 
Brightful's testimony, while perhaps supporting the general 
conclusion that she has emotional and psychiatric 
problems, is notable for its lack of detail. It contains no 
explanation of the precise nature of her problems, and no 
explanation of how her condition would impair her ability to 
work as a legal secretary. Nor does she claim that her 
problems have greatly intensified in 1999, and are therefore 
responsible for the sharp reduction in her hours in 1999 as 
compared to 1998. Rather, it is clear from her testimony 
that her mental and emotional difficulties have existed 
throughout her adult life. 
 
Without any further explanation of Brightful's mental and 
emotional condition (or at least some indication that this 
condition will deteriorate in the future), there is simply no 
record basis for the conclusion that Brightful's emotional 
and psychiatric problems constitute the sort of"additional 
circumstances" contemplated by Faish's second prong. 
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While we do not belittle Brightful's problems, nevertheless 
Brightful has the burden of demonstrating how these 
problems impair her ability to work. In our view, she has 
not even attempted to meet this burden. At the very least, 
such an attempt would include an explanation as to how 
she was able to work full-time as a legal secretary in the 
past (and indeed was able to work a significant number of 
hours in 1998), and yet cannot do so in the future. E.g., In 
re: Wardlow, 167 B.R. 148, 152 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1993) 
(holding that the debtor had failed to satisfy the second 
prong of the Brunner test because the debtor"offered no 
proof of the severity of [her] medical condition. [She] is 
sufficiently healthy to perform her job, and offered no 
indication she would be unable to perform in the future."). 
 
In sum, Brightful has failed to demonstrate the type of 
exceptional circumstances that are necessary in order to 
meet her burden under the second prong of Faish . She is 
intelligent, physically healthy, currently employed, 
possesses useful skills as a legal secretary, and has no 
extraordinary, non-discretionary expenses. While she does 
have one dependent, her daughter is now only two years 
from the age of majority, and therefore this legal 
dependency is nearly at end. Thus we readily conclude that 
Brightful has failed to satisfy her burden. E.g. , In re: 
Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining 
that the second prong of the test requires a showing of "the 
type of barrier that would lead us to believe [the debtor] will 
lack the ability to repay for several years," such as 
psychiatric problems preventing work, lack of usable job 
skills and severely limited education, or the necessity of 
fully supporting several dependents); Brunner , 831 F.2d at 
396-97 (holding that the debtor had failed to carry her 
burden under the second prong because, inter alia, "[s]he is 
not disabled, nor elderly," and "[n]o evidence was presented 
indicating a total foreclosure of job prospects in her area of 
training"); Brunner, 46 B.R. at 755 (noting that 
circumstances that would satisfy the second prong"have 
been found most frequently as a result of illness . . . a lack 
of usable job skills . . . the existence of a large number of 
dependents . . . or a combination of these"). Because 
Brightful has failed to meet her burden under the second 
prong of the Faish test, we hold that her student loans are 
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not dischargeable, and there is no need for us to address 
the third prong of the test. Faish, 72 F.3d at 306. 
 
We realize that our result in this case might appear 
harsh, especially given the fact that Brightful does not have 
her college degree and is unlikely ever to attain it, as the 
Bankruptcy Court found. Therefore, unlike many student 
loan debtors, she cannot anticipate significantly increased 
earnings in the future that would flow from her educational 
investment. Instead, she must for the foreseeable future 
rely upon her existing legal secretarial skills to fund her 
expenses and educational debt. This situation is 
unfortunate, but it does not excuse Brightful from meeting 
her student loan obligations. As we observed in Faish: 
 
       [F]ederal student loan programs were not designed to 
       turn the government into an insurer of educational 
       value. Students who benefit from guaranteed loan 
       programs normally would not be eligible to receive any 
       financing or only financing at a higher rate of interest. 
       Since the decision of whether or not to borrow for a 
       college education lies with the individual, it is the 
       student, not the taxpayers, that must accept the 
       consequences of the decision to borrow. 
 
Id. at 305 (internal quotations marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
In other words, when a student loan borrower accepts 
money from the government, she strikes a bargain. And 
"[l]ike all bargains, it entails risk. It is for each student 
individually to decide whether the risks of future hardship 
outweigh the potential benefits of a deferred-payment 
education." Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756. Here, Brightful struck 
her bargain, she took her risk, and unfortunately, things 
did not work out as planned. Brightful's hardship is real, 
but under the Faish test, it is not "undue," and therefore 
we cannot discharge her obligation to repay her student 
loans. 
 
In light of the foregoing, we will REVERSE the February 
28, 2000 order of the District Court. 
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